1、Maintaining Americas Coercive Economic StrengthFive Trends to Watch in U.S.Sanctions:A Report from Select Members of the CNAS Task Force on the Future of U.S.SanctionsHoward Berman,Paula Dobriansky(Co-Chair),Sue Eckert,Kimberly Ann Elliot,David Goldwyn,Peter Harrell(Principal Co-Author),Theodore Kas
2、singer,George Lopez,Richard Nephew,Stephen Rademaker,Frederick Reynolds,Elizabeth Rosenberg(Principal Co-Author),Daleep Singh,Julianne Smith,Adam Szubin(Co-Chair),Juan Zarate,and Rachel ZiembaMARCH 2019AcknowledgmentsThe authors would like to thank all of the members of the CNAS Task Force on the Fu
3、ture of U.S.Sanctions who contributed to the critical series of discussions that informed the authors opinions expressed in this piece.The authors would also like to thank Neil Bhatiya,Sam Dorshimer,Ashley Feng,Edoardo Saravalle,Kaleigh Thomas,and all of the other members of the CNAS team in 2017 an
4、d 2018 who made the task force possible.The authors would also like to thank especially Maura McCarthy and Melody Cook for their assistance in the production of this report.About the CNAS Task Force on the Future of U.S.SanctionsIn June 2017,the Center for a New American Security(CNAS)launched its T
5、ask Force on the Future of U.S.Sanctions,consisting of former senior U.S.officials,corporate representatives,and academic and nonprofit experts.It examined developments in specific sanctions programs,such as those targeting North Korea,Venezuela,and Iran;emerging cross-cutting themes,such as the imp
6、act of technological changes on U.S.sanctions;congressional-executive branch relations regarding sanctions;and trans-Atlantic cooperation on these measures.During 2017 and 2018,the task force hosted a range of high-level government officials and distinguished thought leaders.1Task force members anal
7、yzed key trends in U.S.sanctions and global developments that could potentially affect U.S.sanctions and other coercive economic measures in the future.This brief describes the five most important of those trends and offers concise summaries of issues that sanctions and national security policymaker
8、s should consider.The below members of the task force have publicly signed on to the findings and recommendations of the report.They do so in their individual capacity;they do not speak for any institutions with which they are affiliated:Howard BermanPaula Dobriansky,Co-Chair Sue EckertKimberly Ann
9、Elliot David GoldwynPeter Harrell,Principal Co-AuthorTheodore KassingerGeorge LopezRichard NephewStephen RademakerFrederick ReynoldsElizabeth Rosenberg,Principal Co-AuthorDaleep SinghJulianne SmithAdam Szubin,Co-ChairJuan ZarateRachel ZiembaCover PhotoThis photo illustration shows a detail view of t
10、he Buy-Sell board in a Bureau de Change on April 17,2007 in London.The British Pound has hit the two dollar mark today in trading for the first time since September 1992 as well as trading at a 27-month low against the euro.(Bruno Vincent/Getty Images)CNASDC1IntroductionU.S.foreign policy officials
11、have embraced economic sanctions as a tool of choice for American foreign policy.Decisionmakers have deployed sanctions against stra-tegic adversaries and national security threats ranging from Russia to non-state actors such as terrorist groups,drug cartels,and businesspeople who engage in corrupt
12、activities.The appeal to both policy leaders and key constituent groups of the potent economic impacts of sanctions in several recent high-profile cases,particu-larly those of Iran,Russia,North Korea,and Venezuela,combined with broad bipartisan support for aggressive use of U.S.sanctions,suggests th
13、at the United States will favor this policy tool and be an active practitioner in the years ahead.This brief describes five of the most prominent and influential trends that could affect U.S.sanctions and other coercive economic measures in the future.The five trends are:(1)a shift toward more aggre
14、ssive use of U.S.unilateral sanctions;(2)the growing role of Congress in enacting sanctions and managing their implementation;(3)an increased potential for unintended consequences as a result of growing complexity in sanctions;(4)accel-erating efforts of foreign governments to insulate trade and pay
15、ment channels from U.S.sanctions;and(5)new technological developments that may have the potential to both enhance and weaken the impact of U.S.sanctions in the years ahead.This brief represents solely the views of the authors,who have contributed to this report in their personal capacities.It does n
16、ot necessarily reflect the views of other members of the task force or of any institutions with which the authors are affiliated.Trend 1:Shift Toward More Aggressive Use of U.S.Unilateral Sanctions,Including Secondary SanctionsU.S.sanctions policymakers have long contemplated or imposed sanctions un
17、ilaterally,such as the longstanding U.S.embargo on Cuba or the U.S.sanctions on Iran and Libya enacted in the 1990s.However,over the past several decades,American officials have generally striven to act multilaterally,either by obtaining U.N.Security Council sanctions,such as those imposed in 2016 a
18、nd 2017 on North Korea,or by developing coalitions of like-minded states to impose multilateral sanctions,such as the joint U.S.-E.U.sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014.Key Takeaways This brief by members of the CNAS Task Force on the Future of U.S.Sanctions describes five high-impact recent develop
19、ments in Americas use of sanctions and the implications of these developments for the future of U.S.sanctions.The five developments are:1 A shift toward more aggressive use of U.S.unilateral sanctions,including secondary sanctions;2 Congresss growing role in sanctions implementations and management;
20、3 An increase in unintended consequences;4 Growing foreign government efforts to circumvent the U.S.financial system and U.S.sanctions;and 5 Increasingly important role of technology.The brief also recommends a set of steps U.S.policymakers should take to maintain the power of U.S.sanc-tions in the
21、future.These include promoting new financial technology and addressing the unintended con-sequences of the intensive use of unilateral sanctions.The brief concludes that policymakers must dedicate much more substantial economic,legal,and technological resources to tracking and assessing trends relev
22、ant to the development and use of sanctions.The authors hope this brief will serve to directly contribute to the strengthening of the U.S.economy and national security.ENERGY,ECONOMICS&SECURITY|MARCH 2019Maintaining Americas Coercive Economic Strength:Five Trends to Watch in U.S.Sanctions2During thi
23、s period policymakers have typically seen unilateral sanctions as a last-resort option.This was in part because of the potentially more limited financial impact but also because sanctions are designed to isolate their target.That diplomatic impact can be eroded when sanctions can be more easily fram
24、ed as an unwarranted aggression by a single hostile country.In the last several years,however,the United States has shown a renewed willingness to deploy unilateral sanc-tions both aggressively and quickly.The United States has not obtained any significant multilateral support for the sweeping round
25、 of Russia sanctions that Congress passed in 2017.No major country has joined the Donald Trump administration in reimposing sanctions on Iran after the U.S.withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA),also known as the Iran nuclear deal,in May 2018.The United States has also become
26、increasingly willing to impose unilateral sanctions to combat political repres-sion and human rights abuses.The U.S.government has used its broad human rights sanctioning authority,the Global Magnitsky Act,to designate officials and busi-nesspeople in countries as diverse as Honduras,Israel,Democrat
27、ic Republic of Congo,and Saudi Arabia.The administration has also significantly intensified sanctions on the authoritarian Venezuelan government of Nicols Maduro.The United States has recently used sanctions against treaty allies,targeting two Turkish officials over Turkeys detention of an American
28、pastor.The Trump administration also acted against ally Saudi Arabia in imposing sanctions on Saudi Arabian officials involved in the murder in Turkey of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.Perhaps the most striking aspect of the shift over the past several years is that U.S.unilateral sanctions increasingly
29、 not only restrict business activities by U.S.companies or people,but are intended to target third-country companies and people as wellalso known as secondary sanctions.In imposing sanctions on Iran both during the 20102015 period and following President Trumps withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018,
30、for example,the United States aggressively deployed the threat of secondary sanctions against European,Chinese,and other companies that could conduct business with Iran.The policy intent was to ensure that companies withdrew from Iran even if their governments con-tinued to allow trade with Iran and
31、 opposed U.S.policy toward Iran.Another relevant example is the array of U.S.secondary sanctions on Russia,which deter foreign companies from engaging in certain business with the Russian defense,energy,and financial sectors even where the businesses remain legal under domestic law in the jurisdicti
32、ons in which they operate.Recent cases of unilateral U.S.secondary sanctions targeting Russia and Iran have shown that such sanctions can have significant economic effects.Irans economy,for example,is already showing signs of strain,while sanc-tions imposed against Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska an
33、d his companies in April 2018 have had significant business and market impacts.However,unilateral U.S.sanctions also trigger strong political opposition abroad,as foreign governments generally see such sanctions as an illegitimate,extraterritorial application of U.S.law.Several governments,including
34、 a number of European governments strongly opposed to the Trump adminis-trations policy toward Iran,are actively developing tools to circumvent U.S.sanctions.These tools will be difficult to develop in the short term,but growing global political opposition to U.S.unilateral sanctions could have lon-
35、ger-term economic and diplomatic repercussions.Trend 2:Congresss Growing Role in Sanctions Implementation and Management Congresss current dispute with the Trump administra-tion over whether and how to increase U.S.sanctions on Russia is simply the latest in a long line of disagree-ments between Con
36、gress and the executive branch over the exercise of economic sanctions.In 1986,for example,a supermajority in Congress enacted sanc-tions against the apartheid government of South Africa over President Ronald Reagans veto.In 1998,many members of Congress were sharply critical of President Bill Clint
37、ons decision to waive provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act that had targeted foreign companies investing in oil and gas projects in Iran.Clinton vetoed a new Iran sanctions bill that Congress passed shortly after he issued the waivers.President Barack Obama regularly disagreed with Congres
38、s over Iran sanctions between 2010 and 2015,and Congress passed a number of Iran sanctions laws accommodating some but disregarding other concerns of the Obama administration.Indeed,In the last several years,the United States has shown a renewed willingness to deploy unilateral sanctions both aggres
39、sively and quickly.CNASDC3a study of 104 sanctions bills introduced in Congress between 1983 and 2014 found that the executive branch expressed at least some opposition to at least 76 of them.2 This longstanding tension between Congress and the executive branch about sanctions reflects a natural fri
40、ction,given that the Constitution splits authority over foreign policy between the two.Over the years,Congress has been instrumental in enacting sanctions that serve policies with widespread public support,such as the sanctions on apartheid South Africa,the sanctions on Irans oil exports in late 201
41、1,and the 2017 U.S.sanctions on Russia.But a too-tight congressional straightjacket on the executive branch in order to constrain approach to the implementation of sanctions bears the risk of turning one of Americas few tools of coercive diplomacy into a poor tool to induce change by target countrie
42、s.The exec-utive branch has long been charged with negotiating with foreign governments on behalf of the United States and then submitting overall agreements to Congress,rather than having to subject every individual piece of foreign policy to Congress for approval.Heavy-handed congres-sional oversi
43、ght of sanctions could severely undermine the ability to reward policy change by,for example,Russia,Venezuela,or North Korea with a reduction or removal of sanctions and could thereby undermine the power of sanctions to incentivize behavioral change.This risk may be heightened by Congresss recent ef
44、fort to play an expanded role in overseeing ongoing implementation of sanctions.This trend was epito-mized by provisions in the aggressive 2017 Countering Americas Adversaries Through Sanctions Act(CAATSA)that require the president to submit any significant reduction in U.S.sanctions on Russia,inclu
45、ding simply removing an individual person or company from U.S.Russia sanctions lists,to Congress for review before the administration can implement the proposed action.Congress also gave itself a new level of involvement in imposing sanctions in the 2016 Global Magnitsky Act.The statute targets corr
46、uption and human rights abuses and essentially lets congressional committees nominate specific individuals and companies for sanctions.This development raises important questions about the appropriate role for Congress in identifying specific sanctions targets,as opposed to setting general policy an
47、d parameters.Going forward,Congress should be restrained in its attempts to manage sanctions implementation.The executive branch requires flexibility and discretion in implementing sanctions to ensure that it can adapt to changing circumstances,such as when the govern-ment or a political figure targ
48、eted by sanctions changes its policy.Put another way:the executive branch also requires a degree of flexibility in the lifting of sanc-tions to ensure that sanctions can be used as a carrot in diplomatic negotiations.Traditional congressional oversight of the executive branchs sanctions implemen-tat
49、ion through hearings,the nominations process,and other tools is always appropriate.However,Congress should move cautiously in further expanding its role in the implementation of sanctions.Instead,it should focus on its longstanding role in helping establish when and where the United States deploys s
50、anctions,and whether such decisions advance U.S.national interests.Trend 3:An Increase in Unintended ConsequencesThe last several years have seen an expansion in the type and complexity of U.S.sanctions.In 2014 the United States established a new kind of sanctions designation by imposing sanctions o
